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Introduction
In response to questions raised by the recent financial and economic crisis, the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy are receiving increased attention in the economic literature. A very influential modelling strategy in this regard is the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) approach pioneered by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) . The key idea of the strategy is to model the relationships among reduced form and structural innovations by employing institutional information. This allows studying the short-run macroeconomic consequences of structural policy shocks. Using quarterly US data from 1960 to 1997, the authors find what is considered a stylised fact: an increase in government expenditures has a statistically significant positive effect on output, whereas an increase in taxes has a significantly negative effect.
Somewhat different in spirit are the event study and narrative approaches taken by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) , Ramey (2011a) , and Romer and Romer (2010) . Here, structural policy shocks are not identified through the reduced form errors, but by employing narrative information from outside the econometric model. Romer and Romer (2010) identify discretionary tax policy shocks based on the history of US postwar tax changes. They collect all important US tax legislation enacted during the period 1945 to 2007 and use official government sources to classify these as either exogenous or endogenous with regard to current fluctuations in output. Revenue forecasts are used to measure the size of the shocks. This identification strategy delivers a series of exogenous tax shocks that can be included as regressors in econometric models. Using an autoregressive distributed lag model of output growth with their tax shock series as the independent variable, Romer and Romer (2010) find that tax changes can have a significant impact-an exogenous tax increase worth 1 percent of GDP lowers GDP by nearly 3 percent in the medium term. However, using the Romer and Romer (2010) exogenous tax shock series in a VAR framework, Favero and Giavazzi (2011) and Perotti (2011) find smaller effects. In an application of the narrative approach to the United Kingdom, Cloyne (2011) finds results very similar to the original work for the United States-increasing taxes by 1 percent of GDP depresses GDP by 2.5 percent over three years. In a different, but conceptionally related, approach to overcoming the identification problem, Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Ramey (2011a) employ exogenous increases in defence spending to investigate how fiscal policy affects output. 1 Although studies using the aforementioned approaches show remarkable differences in the effects of fiscal policy shocks on important macroeconomic variables, such as consumption or wages (for a discussion, see, e.g., Fontana, 2009) , they all generally find that governments can boost the economy by either increasing spending or lowering taxes. However, results derived from US data do not necessarily hold true for other countries. Examples for applications of the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) SVAR modelling approach to countries outside the United States include Perotti (2004) , Marcellino (2006) , and Afonso and Sousa (2009) . These studies focus on multiple countries and hence permit cross-country comparisons. The empirical results suggest remarkable differences in the effects of fiscal policy across countries. Hence, fiscal policy transmission mechanisms might be country specific.
Several multi-country studies on tax change that also include Germany use the SVAR modelling approach (Perotti, 2004; Marcellino, 2006; Afonso and Sousa, 2009 ). This research does not provide convincing evidence for the effectiveness of fiscal policy and, in some specifications, Perotti (2004) and Afonso and Sousa (2009) report tax multipliers characterised by unexpected signs. Heppke-Falk et al. (2006) find statistically insignificant effects of shocks to aggregate taxes. Similarly, Baum and Koester (2011) , using a threshold VAR approach, conclude that revenue policies 'have a generally … limited impact'. Höppner (2001) , as well as Bode et al. (2009) , find tax multipliers significantly different from zero, albeit they are smaller than one in absolute terms. To the best of our knowledge, Breuer and Buettner (2010) provide the only application of the Romer and Romer (2010) narrative approach to Germany. They find a short-run multiplier for tax changes close to one in absolute terms. Taken together, the literature has not yet reached a consensus on the statistical significance, or even the direction, of tax policy effects in Germany.
This paper adds to the literature an analysis of the effects of legislated tax changes in Germany using the narrative approach of Romer and Romer (2010) . Using the Finanzbericht, an annual publication of the Federal Ministry of Finance, we identify all important tax changes in Germany between 1974:1 and 2010:2. Only exogenous tax shocks are used to derive the short-run macroeconomic impacts of legislated tax changes in a five-variable VAR containing output, government spending and revenue, inflation, and a short-term interest rate. Our study differs in at least two important ways from conventional VAR studies on fiscal policy effects. First, we set the tax shock to the quarter of announcement rather than to the time of implementation and include lagged values of the tax shock variable. This allows tax shocks to have effects before and after implementation. We label the first class of effects 'anticipation' effects; the second 'implementation' effects. This approach has the advantage of accounting for effects that are due to forward-looking expectations of fiscal policy. Also, in an extension of our model, we explicitly disentangle anticipation and implementation effects by taking an approach similar to one employed by Mertens and Ravn (2011) for the United States, in that we include anticipated future tax shocks as exogenous variables in the VAR.
Germany's monetary policy regime is particularly focussed on stability. The Bundesbank, as an independent central bank with the overriding objective of keeping prices stable, was a strong influence on the design of the European Central Bank. Given the large role this strong monetary policy actor plays in the German situation, we believe that it is important to take monetary policy into account when studying fiscal policy shocks. Thus our second important difference from standard VAR approaches is to allow for an endogenous monetary policy reaction before implementation of tax changes and thus for interactions between fiscal shocks and monetary policy. Breuer and Buettner (2010) also apply the Romer and Romer (2010) strategy to identify German tax policy shocks, but their methodological approach is considerably different from ours. Rather than studying the dynamic effects of tax changes by shocking the exogenous tax series directly, Breuer and Buettner (2010) use the estimated coefficients on the tax shock variable to identify a structural system of equations modelling the relationships among the residuals. This does allow studying the effects of exogenous changes in government spending, but the problem is that potentially invalid theoretical identification assumptions can produce misleading empirical results. Since we concentrate on the effects of exogenous tax changes, we do not to make additional identification assumptions. Finally, Breuer and Buettner (2010) neither study the timing of the tax shocks nor take monetary policy into account. Our approach has the advantage of allowing for and differentiating between both anticipation and implementation effects and possible interactions between fiscal and monetary policy.
Our results indicate a statistically significant, albeit quantitatively small, reduction in output following announcement of a tax change. In response to an increase in the tax-to-GDP ratio of 1 percentage point, the peak output reduction is 0.67 percent. The output effect becomes statistically insignificant in the fourth quarter after announcement and then quickly turns toward zero. Moreover, our estimated impulse response functions suggest an offsetting monetary policy reaction. Monetary policy, as measured by a short-term interest rate, becomes significantly more expansionary after the tax increase in an attempt to bring output back to its steady state and thereby avoid an increase in inflationary pressures. As a result, monetary policy almost completely compensates the fiscal impulse. Distinguishing between anticipation and implementation effects, we find evidence only for the former. Tax shocks have a significant impact on GDP after announcement of a change in the law, but are insignificant in the quarter of implementation. This could be explained by an offsetting monetary policy reaction that starts affecting GDP before actual implementation. Taken together, our results offer only weak evidence in support of important output effects of legislated tax changes under the condition of a stability-oriented monetary policy regime. Effects in Germany are smaller than those estimated for the United States and the United Kingdom and show lower persistence. This difference is consistent with our hypothesis that an endogenous monetary policy reaction offsets the fiscal impulse in Germany, as the Fed and the Bank of England were less stability-oriented during our sample period than the Bundesbank. These results are a valuable contribution to the current level of knowledge on the fiscal policy transmission mechanism in Germany. Our explanation for the mixed and generally inconclusive picture of Germany drawn by VAR literature on fiscal policy effects is that this literature omits anticipation effects and endogenous monetary policy responses The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses methodology and data. Results are given in Section 3. Section 4 addresses the robustness of the results; Section 5 concludes. Supplementary tables and figures can be found in the Appendix.
Methodology and Data

Benchmark Model Specification
To study the effects of legislated tax changes in Germany, we employ VAR modelling as pioneered by Sims (1980) . In the benchmark case, we estimate the five-variable VAR in Equation (1).
(1)
y t is a 5x1 vector of endogenous variables containing log real GDP, government expenditures and revenues as percentage of GDP, and the rate of inflation, as well as a short-term interest rate. For details on variable definitions and data sources, see Table A1 in the Appendix. Figure A1 in the Appendix provides time-series plots of each individual series. c t is a vector of exogenous variables, containing a constant, a step dummy for reunified Germany, and a step dummy for participation in the European Monetary Union (EMU). x t-i , i = 0,…,m are current and lagged values of our exogenous tax shock series. Unit root testing shows that the time series are integrated of order 1. 2 Impulse response functions are computed by changing the exogenous tax shock variable in Equation (1). The size of the shock is set to 1 percent of GDP. Error bands are constructed by a parametric bootstrap procedure. They are based on 10,000 draws of the coefficient vector from a multivariate normal distribution with expected value equal to the estimated parameter vector of the VAR and covariance matrix equal to the estimated covariance matrix of the parameter vector. Following the literature (Romer and Romer, 2010; Favero and Giavazzi, 2011; Mertens and Ravn, 2011) , the error bands show one standard error deviations of the resulting impulse responses.
Nevertheless, based on theoretical results put forward by Sims and Uhlig (1991) and reflecting the practice in the applied VAR literature (e.g., Bank, 2011; Höppner, 2001) , we estimate the VAR in levels.
The lag length on the endogenous variable is set to four, which is standard in the VAR literature (e.g., Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Perotti, 2004; Höppner, 2010) , while we include eight lags of the tax shock variable. In the benchmark case, we study the effects of legislated tax changes dating the tax shock at the quarter of announcement. The average lag between announcement and implementation is two quarters. Hence, by including eight lags, we typically cover both anticipation and implementation effects. The sample period is 1974:1 to 2010:2. At the time the dataset was constructed, 2010:2 was the last quarter for which tax changes were covered in our sources. The choice of the first date is motivated by Perotti (2004) , who identifies a structural break around 1974. Heppke-Falk et al. (2006) and Baum and Koester (2011) use a similar sample period.
An Exogenous Tax Shock Series for Germany
The tax shock series employed in this paper is based on 51 important legislated tax changes that occurred between 1974 and 2010. The size of the tax change is measured by the forecasted revenue effect within the first 12 months after full implementation of the new law and is expressed in percent of GDP. Revenue forecasts and identification of important tax laws are from the Finanzbericht. Only tax laws with an estimated impact on tax liabilities greater than 0.10 percent of GDP are used. The main idea of Romer and Romer's (2010) methodological approach is that the motivation for a tax change can be inferred from official government sources, which allows classification of the shocks as either exogenous or endogenous. Assuming that this identification assumption holds, this procedure delivers an exogenous tax shock series orthogonal to current innovations in u t . Impulse response functions derived from the exogenous tax shock series then give consistent estimates of their short-run macroeconomic effects. Table A2 in the Appendix provides details on all tax changes we identify as important.
The motivation behind tax measures is inferred from official government sources. By rules of parliamentary procedure, motivation and intent must be explained in the draft of any bill. In the event a bill is changed during the legislative process, the report of the leading parliamentary committee, which is usually the Finanzausschuss, contains an explanation of the motivation behind the change. Furthermore, protocols from discussions in the two parliamentary chambers in Germany, Bundestag and Bundesrat, are also helpful. The Finanzbericht contains explanations and, sometimes, classifications of the motivations behind law changes. Extending the work of Romer and Romer (2010) , tax changes can be assigned to one of the following categories.
Tax policies introduced for countercyclical reasons, with the aim of offsetting current deviations of actual from potential output, are obviously endogenous. Tax changes might be enacted to finance an increase in government spending. The increase in government spending can be interpreted as a structural innovation in the spending equation; hence, this tax change is endogenous to important contemporaneous macroeconomic shocks. Similarly, tax policies sometimes react to important policy events; for example, German Reunification, completion of the European common market, or introduction of the euro. Here, the effect of the event triggering the policy move and the tax change itself cannot credibly be disentangled; as a consequence, this class of tax changes is treated as endogenous. The latter class of tax shocks is not considered by Romer and Romer (2010) in their study of the United States, but, given the size of the aforementioned shocks, this class is of considerable importance in the case of Germany.
Figure 1: Exogenous Tax Changes and the Business Cycle
Notes: Left scale shows exogenous tax shock series in percent of GDP; right scale shows annual GDP growth in percent. Exogenous tax shocks are timed at the quarter of announcement. Growth rates are based on the Federal Republic of Germany until 1991:4, and on a unified Germany thereafter.
Finally, Romer and Romer (2010) consider two classes of exogenous tax changes. First, tax changes made to consolidate the budget. These laws are related only to past spending and tax decisions and, hence, are exogenous with regard to contemporaneous macroeconomic shocks. Second, policymakers might lower taxes in an effort to stimulate investment or consumption with the objective of increasing long-term growth. Other measures in this category are undertaken to offset regional disparities or to promote social equity. Moreover, tax changes are sometimes made to increase the efficiency of the tax system. In all these cases, the tax change is unrelated to contemporaneous macroeconomic shocks. Figure 1 presents our series of exogenous tax shocks contrasted with annual real GDP growth in percent. The correlation coefficient of 0.05 illustrates that there is no notable systematic relationship between the two series. To systematically investigate the exogeneity of our tax shock series, we test whether the tax shock series can be predicted by the residual vector u t from the model in Equation (1). As a first test, we run a linear regression with the tax shock series as dependent and the residuals as independent variables. In a second test, we construct an ordinal series of tax shocks, coding a tax decrease in a quarter as -1, no change as 0, and a tax increase as 1. In an ordered logistic regression, we check whether this series can by predicted by the residuals from Equation (1). As our exogenous tax shock series cannot be predicted either linearly or in an ordinal framework, we conclude that it is indeed exogenous. Results are available on request. Exogenous Tax Shock Series in % of GDP Annual GDP growth in %
Distinguishing Anticipation and Implementation Effects
Dating the tax shock at the quarter of announcement as in Section 2.1 allows studying the macroeconomic effects of a tax law after announcement. However, using this dating system mixes effects arising from anticipation of the tax shock with those occurring due to actual changes in tax liabilities after implementation. To differentiate between these two effects, we run the regression in Equation (2), which is similar to the approach taken by Mertens and Ravn (2011). 3 (
The tax shock variable x t now measures the implementation effect and, consequently, is set to the quarter of implementation. In contrast, x t,t+i (i = 1,2,..4) is a tax shock known at time t to be implemented at time t+i and thus captures the anticipation effect. To study the full effect of a preannounced tax shock, we combine the impulse responses to x t-i,t (i = 1,2,…,4) and x t to derive the impulse response functions of a tax shock decided on in t-4 or before and implemented at time t. Up to period t, impulse response functions are solely based on x t,t+i and hence measure pure announcement effects. From t onward, the tax change has been implemented. We label any effects observed afterward as 'implementation' effects, although they may also encompass reactions to the announcement. Since the tax shock is now dated substantially later than previously, we reduce the lag length to four. To make results comparable, we estimate the same number of parameters and start estimation in 1976:1. Note, however, that four quarters of information are lost at the end of the sample, as legislated tax shocks post 2010:2 are not covered. Figure 2 shows the resulting impulse response functions for a positive tax shock corresponding to 1 percent of GDP timed at the quarter of announcement. In case of the inflation rate, the cumulative impulse response function is shown. This represents changes in the price level, which are easier to interpret than changes in the quarter-to-quarter inflation rate. Tax revenues significantly increase after the positive tax shock, peaking six quarters after the announcement and then slowly declining. Government expenditures do not react to the tax shock in the first couple of years after announcement; however, the response function of government expenditures accelerates about three years after announcement. Extending the time horizon of the impulse response functions shows that government expenditures increase significantly for a total of nine quarters in the time span of three to five years after announcement. The peak increase in government expenditures is 0.16 percent of GDP. This suggests that policymakers start increasing expenditures after a period of budget surplus and that tax increases only temporarily lead to a positive fiscal balance. This finding is in line with a key result reported in the literature on fiscal consolidations (von Hagen and Strauch, 2001) , which is that budget adjustment programmes focussing on expenditure reductions rather than on tax increases have a higher probability of success. Detailed estimation results are available on request.
Results
The Benchmark: Effects of Legislated Tax Changes
Following the tax shock, output is reduced in a statistically significant way. The output effect is significant during the first, second, and third quarters and peaks at -0.67 percent in the third quarter. The implicit multiplier is smaller than unity and therefore much smaller than the multiplier derived for the United States by Romer and Romer (2010) , Favero and Giavazzi (2011), and Perotti (2011) , and for the United Kingdom by Cloyne (2011) . Note that output is significantly affected prior to a significant movement in tax revenues. The impact on tax revenues reaches its peak effect in the sixth quarter after the tax shock, whereas output is affected immediately after the shock. Hence, there are important dynamics in the model before the actual peak in tax revenues occurs. This can be interpreted as indirect evidence that anticipation effects dominate implementation effects. After the tax shock, the short-term interest rate declines significantly. At the peak level, the short-term interest rate is reduced by 0.71 percentage points. The price level effect is quantitatively modest and always statistically insignificant.
Our results suggest that tax policy changes have only weak output effects: they are of a small magnitude and quickly become insignificant. This is broadly in line with the conclusion drawn by traditional SVAR studies on tax policy effects in Germany. However, a unique result of our study is the strong interest rate reaction after the tax shock. In response to a tax increase of 1 percent of GDP, the short-term interest rate is reduced by as much as 0.71 percentage points. Following the VAR literature starting with Sims (1980) , we interpret the short-term interest rate as the main monetary policy instrument. The short end of the term structure of interest rates is rather tightly controlled by the central bank and its monetary policy and fiscal policy has no direct effects on day-to-day interest rates in money markets. Thus, the observed strong interest rate reaction suggests that endogenous monetary policy reactions compensate the fiscal impulse and, thereby, affect the size of output effects resulting from tax shocks.
The Bundesbank is well known for its strong emphasis on price stability. Facing policy shocks that threaten to move the economy out of its steady-state position, the bank might be inclined to take countervailing measures so as to prevent spillover effects from fiscal policy on prices via output effects. This view is consistent with a New Keynesian Phillips curve relating inflation to the output gap. 4 Moreover, policy conflicts between Bundesbank and the federal government are discussed in the literature. For instance, Berger (1997) and Berger and de Haan (1999) provide anecdotic evidence of such an offsetting reaction after fiscal policy actions. Melitz (2000) , in a cross-section including Germany, concludes that fiscal and monetary policies move in opposite directions. Hence, our results are consistent with views expressed in other areas of the monetary economics literature.
For the argument of an endogenous monetary policy response to be consistent with our econometric model of the economy, a monetary policy shock must significantly influence output. To check the validity of this assumption, we derive impulse response functions from a Cholesky decomposition with the interest rate ordered last. Our results indicate that an innovation in interest rates significantly depresses output. Hence, the endogenous offsetting interest rate reaction can explain why we observe only weak output effects of tax shocks.
However, there is an important caveat to these findings. Given that our tax shock series is exogenous, shocks occur both during recessions as well as during normal times. 5
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Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions for Legislated Tax Changes
Notes: The figure shows impulse response functions for a tax increase. The size of the shock is 1 percent of GDP. Error bands are one standard error deviations constructed from a parametric bootstrap.
Distinguishing Anticipation and Implementation Effects
The methodology presented in the last section does not allow distinguishing between anticipation and implementation effects of tax changes. However, given the timing of the effects, anticipation effects might matter, as we observe output and interest rate effects prior to the peak in tax revenues. Of course, tax shocks are anticipated prior to their actual implementation due to their coverage in cabinet, parliament, and media. Professional economic actors, particularly the central bank, are likely to engage in forward-looking behaviour and thus anticipate fiscal policy shocks. By means of the extended model from Equation (2), we seek to disentangle anticipation and implementation effects. The resulting impulse response functions for a tax shock decided on in -4 or earlier and expected to become effective at time 0 are shown in Figure 3 . Up to period 0, impulse response functions measure pure anticipation effects. Beginning with period 0, the tax change has been implemented and we call those effects observed afterward 'implementation' effects.
Shortly after implementation, the implicit multiplier effect on tax revenues reaches a value of one. One year after implementation, tax revenues start declining, similar to the results presented in the last section. Impulse response functions indicate a significant reaction of government expenditures three quarters prior to implementation. In anticipation of rising government revenues, policymakers appear to increase spending. Output decreases in anticipation of the tax increase, with the effect being statistically significant four quarters prior to actual implementation, but not afterward. Quantitatively, the influence of tax shocks on output is small. Four quarters before implementation, output decreases by 0.64 percent. After implementation, the peak effect is -0.47 percent. Results do not indicate notable price level effects. As argued above, this is due to monetary policy actively promoting stability: interest rates are cut by 0.53 percentage points in the third quarter before implementation and stay at that level for three additional quarters. In the second quarter after implementation, the interest rate effect reaches -0.75 percentage points and then slowly returns to zero. Interest rates are lowered statistically significantly in the fourth and third quarter before implementation of a tax shock.
Thus, these findings confirm the results from the last section. Legislated tax changes have output effects before actual implementation and there is an offsetting monetary policy reaction before the tax shock is actually implemented. This suggests that monetary policymakers anticipate tax changes and react in an appropriate way taking into account transmission lags. Given the typical lags involved in monetary policy transmission in Germany (Clausen and Hayo, 2006) , the interest rate reaction pattern well explains the insignificance of output effects around the time of implementation. Put differently, the offsetting monetary policy reaction helps explain the small tax multipliers found here as well as in other studies on Germany.
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Figure 3: Distinguishing Anticipation and Implementation Effects
Notes: The figure shows impulse response functions for a tax increase decided on in -4 or earlier and expected to become effective at time 0. The size of the shock is 1 percent of GDP. Error bands are one standard error deviations constructed from a parametric bootstrap.
Robustness
Our results suggest that monetary policy plays an important role in Germany's fiscal policy transmission mechanism. The change in monetary regime due to introduction of the euro could have affected the transmission of fiscal policy shocks. Therefore, we study the effects of tax policy shocks in a pre-EMU subsample. Although estimation of the VAR model for the pre-EMU period of 1974:1−1998:4 is feasible, precision is less than optimal due to limited degrees of freedom. Compared to the full sample, we find weaker output and stronger interest rate effects after announcement of the tax change. When the tax shock is set to the quarter of announcement, the output effect becomes insignificant, while the magnitude of the interest rate effect increases. Interest rates are reduced by as much as 1.44 percentage points in response to a 1 percentage point increase in the tax-to-GDP ratio. Distinguishing anticipation and implementation effects suggests that output is significantly reduced four quarters before implementation. Post-implementation, the output effect becomes insignificant. Again, monetary policy reacts by reducing interest rates prior to implementation. The results found in the pre-EMU sample hence strengthen our main conclusions. Evidence for output effects of legislated tax changes is weak because the Bundesbank has offset the fiscal stimulus. The post-EMU sample is too short for estimating the model, but comparing the pre-EMU results with those from the full sample suggests that the Bundesbank reacts more strongly than the ECB to exogenous tax shocks in Germany. Given that the ECB supposedly takes into account developments in the whole euro area, this is a plausible result.
Our results are also robust with respect to variations in the monetary policy indicator. In the benchmark cases, the interest rate for day-to-day money was chosen because of the theoretical prior that this measure is closest to the central bank's actual policy instrument. As a robustness test, we employ interest rates for both one-month money and 90-day money. The outcomes of these exercises are similar to those presented previously, except that the output effect is weaker.
In principle, our results could be driven by specific properties of the examined tax laws. Our exogenous tax shock series consists of two classes of tax laws: those implemented for consolidation purposes and those addressing long-term growth. We identified four laws designed for budget consolidation. When excluding those, the results remain qualitatively unchanged. Further, the analysis presented here is on the aggregate level and ignores the composition of the tax stimulus. In reality, however, tax changes involve changes to various types of taxes. When using only changes in income-based taxes, i.e., changes in the Einkommensteuer, Körperschaftssteuer, and Solidaritätszuschlag, results remain qualitatively unchanged. Changes to other types of taxes occur regularly, but not often enough to allow estimation of their individual effects.
As evident from Figure 1 , there is one large outlier in the tax series at the beginning of the 2000s. The Steuersenkungsgesetz was expected to lower tax revenues by a total of 2.40 percent of GDP. This revenue effect was primarily driven by large permanent tax cuts to be implemented in 2005 and by forwarding to 2001 tax cuts originally designed to be implemented in 2002. When removing the latter component, the tax shock amounts to 1.71 percent of GDP. This size is in line with other tax shocks included in the model and removing the large one-time effect has little impact on the results.
Our results are robust to other modifications, too. Using dummy variables, we control for the creation and (factual) breakdown of the European Monetary System as well as the recent financial crisis. We also reduce the lag length in Equation (1) from 8 to 6. None of these variations affects the outcome of our analysis. Impulse response functions for all these modifications are available on request.
Conclusion
This paper studies short-run macroeconomic effects of legislated tax changes in Germany in the framework of a five-variable VAR consisting of output, taxes, government expenditures, inflation, and the short-term interest rate. Following Romer and Romer (2010) , identification of the tax policy shock is achieved by constructing an exogenous tax shock series based on a legislative history of Germany's tax policy. Our results indicate a small, yet significant, reduction in output following announcement of a tax change. In response to a 1 percentage point increase in the tax-to-GDP ratio, we observe a maximum output reduction of 0.67 percent. The output effect becomes statistically insignificant in the fourth quarter after announcement and then quickly turns toward zero. Moreover, the impulse response functions suggest an offsetting endogenous monetary policy reaction. Monetary policy, as measured by a short-term interest rate, loosens significantly after the tax increase, thereby compensating the fiscal impulse. After distinguishing between anticipation and implementation effects, we find evidence for only the former: tax shocks have a significant impact on GDP in the period following announcement of the change, but are insignificant at the quarter of implementation. In our view, the weak impact of exogenous fiscal policy shocks can be explained by monetary policy actions initiated by a forward-looking, stabilityoriented central bank, the Bundesbank. Our results indicate that monetary policy reacts immediately after the announcement of tax changes, so that, after taking into account the transmission lags, monetary policy almost fully absorbs the impact of fiscal policy on output and prices at the time of implementation. Moreover, we find evidence that the central bank does not offset exogenous tax changes announced during recessions, which implies that such shocks have much larger output effects. We find values of up to 2 percent in the aftermath of an increase in the tax-to-GDP ratio of 1 percentage point, which are similar to multipliers found in studies on other countries.
Our results offer an explanation for the mixed and generally inconclusive picture of fiscal policy effects in Germany as drawn by the extant VAR literature. Tax multipliers estimated with German data are of a small magnitude, often insignificant, and occasionally show expansionary effects. Traditional SVAR analyses are based on innovations in the VAR and, hence, are concerned with fiscal policy shocks around the date of implementation. A forward-looking, offsetting monetary policy reaction offers an explanation for the apparent failure of these studies to reach coherent conclusions. Methodologically, ignoring anticipation effects and choosing specifications without a monetary side appear to be inappropriate oversights in modelling Germany's fiscal policy transmission mechanism.
Our study of fiscal policy effects leaves ample opportunity for further research. Any empirical investigation on the effects of fiscal policy must be based on past economic data. However, with the introduction of the euro-and given the importance of the offsetting monetary policy reaction found in this paper-there are good reasons to suspect that the current fiscal policy transmission mechanism is different. As more data become available, studying the post-1999 era might provide interesting insights. Until then, our narrative account of Germany's tax history could be used to more closely study the interaction between monetary policy and fiscal policy. Looking at changes brought about by the introduction of the euro might allow generating projections for Germany's fiscal policy transmission mechanism in the European Monetary Union. Given that the ECB focuses less attention on one country than does a national central bank, we would expect to see stronger tax policy effects today than found in our data. 
Figure A1: Data Plots
Notes: y: log of real GDP (as measured by a quantity index), g: government expenditures as % of GDP, t: tax revenue as % of GDP, infl: log difference of implicit GDP deflator, i: rate of interest for day-to-day money. 
